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INTRODUCTION
The major surprise of Egypt’s recent parliamentary 
elections was not that Islamists won a large majori-
ty of the votes. Any keen observer of Egyptian soci-
ety could have guessed that religious parties would 
dominate. What was much less expected was that 
almost 40 percent of those who voted for Islamists 
did not pick the well-established Muslim Brother-
hood, the oldest and largest opposition movement 
in the country. Instead, they backed a coalition of 
three recently created Salafi parties whose figures 
were unknown to most Egyptians before the rev-
olution. The Salafis were also (with a few excep-
tions) initially opposed to the revolution and for-
mally declared their support for Tahrir Square only 
days before Hosni Mubarak’s resignation.2 Despite 
all of this, the Salafi coalition received 28 percent 
of votes for the People’s Assembly, the lower house 
of parliament, securing 127 of 508 seats. The same 
trend was later confirmed in the elections of the 
Shura Council, the upper house, where Salafis took 
45 of 180 seats. How should we make sense of the 
Salafi breakthrough? And now that they represent 
the second strongest force in parliament, what lies 
ahead for their movement? 
MAKING SENSE OF THE SALAFI BREAK-
THROUGH 
The Salafi coalition was made up of three unequal 
partners: a senior partner, Hizb al-Nour (“the party 
of light,” whose candidates obtained 111 seats) and 
two junior partners, al-Bina wa al-Tanmiya  (“con-
struction and development,” 13 seats) and Hizb al-
Asala (“the party of authenticity,” three seats). As 
a result, all election material bore the symbols of 
the Nour Party, and the coalition was sometimes 
presented as the “Nour Party coalition.” Its forma-
tion was announced on October 22, 2011, after the 
Construction and Development Party and the Asala 
Party left the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Democratic 
Coalition,” allegedly because the Brotherhood was 
not willing to include enough of their candidates 
on its lists.3 The Nour Party had also, at one point, 
been close to the “Democratic Coalition,” although 
conflicting stories circulated on whether the party 
was actually thinking of joining, or if it only partic-
ipated in some meetings as an observer.4 
In the elections, the Salafis benefited from the natu-
ral appeal of Islamist parties among Muslim voters. 
There are several reasons for this attraction. First, 
the last few decades have witnessed a “quiet revo-
lution” in Egyptian society marked by the increas-
ing hegemony of conservative Islamic discourse.5 
To many Egyptian Muslims today, it seems obvi-
ous that, as one interviewee put it, “we should of 
course vote for a party with an Islamic reference. 
We’re Muslims, after all!” Interestingly, many of 
those interviewed did not seem aware of (or overly 
concerned by) the differences between the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s conception of Islam, and that of the 
Salafis.6 Another reason for the Islamists’ elector-
al success is that Islamist groups formed the main 
opposition and prime target of regime repression 
under Mubarak. Consequently, they are widely 
seen as having “deserved” power. Because of their 
proclaimed religious ethics, they are also perceived 
as less corrupt. 
This, however, does not explain why voters would 
favor the Salafi coalition over the Muslim Brother-
hood’s lists. Here again there are several reasons. 
To begin with, proponents of Salafism as an ide-
ology have existed in Egypt for almost a century. 
The first Salafi association, Ansar al-Sunna al-Mu-
hammadiyya (“the supporters of the Prophet’s tra-
dition”), came into being in 1926, two years before 
the Brotherhood. While this association remained 
largely confined to scholarly circles and never tried 
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to foster a mass movement, it did publish and dis-
tribute the main Salafi works, making them avail-
able to the Egyptian public. Those works would 
start attracting growing interest in the 1970s, par-
ticularly among students. It was at this point that 
Salafism transformed into a broader social phe-
nomenon. The three parties that took part in the 
Salafi coalition all stem from social-religious net-
works that have existed and developed since that 
period. 
The Nour Party was founded by an informal reli-
gious organization called the “Salafi Da‘wa” (al-
Da‘wa al-Salafiyya), whose leadership is based in 
Alexandria. The origins of the Salafi Da‘wa date 
back to the late 1970s, when its founders – stu-
dents at the faculty of medicine at Alexandria Uni-
versity – broke away from the Islamist student 
groups known as al-Gama‘at al-Islamiyya (“Islam-
ic groups”). Among them was Yasir Burhami, cur-
rently the dominant figure in the organization. The 
Salafi Da‘wa’s stance against violence and refus-
al to engage in formal politics made it relatively 
acceptable to the Mubarak regime. To be sure, the 
group did at times endure repression; its leaders 
were kept under close surveillance and were for-
bidden from traveling outside Alexandria. Howev-
er, the Salafi Da‘wa often benefited from the covert 
support of the regime apparatus, which tried to use 
Salafis to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood’s in-
fluence.7 
In this context, the group’s networks expanded 
beyond Alexandria via students who came to re-
ceive the sheikhs’ teachings before going back to 
their home towns. Soon, the Salafi Da‘wa devel-
oped a basic form of organization comprising vari-
ous sections and branches under an administrative 
council.8 It also provided an array of social servic-
es in neighborhoods, thereby mirroring the activ-
ities of the Brotherhood. This allowed the group 
to establish strong ties with ordinary Egyptians, 
although most of its activities remained under-
ground.9 In the 2000s, the regime allowed sever-
al Salafi preachers, some of them connected to the 
Salafi Da‘wa, to launch Salafi television channels 
broadcasted on Egyptian national satellites. Salafi 
discourse was now made available to all, and it 
gained an audience far beyond the original circles 
of the Salafi Da‘wa. Some of those preachers, in-
cluding Muhammad Hassan and Muhammad Hus-
sein Yaqub, soon became household names across 
the country.
The two other Salafi parties in the coalition also 
drew their strength from previously existing net-
works and organizations, although their relation-
ship with the authorities had been much more 
fraught. The Asala Party was created by a group 
of Salafis based in Cairo and was led by a number 
of sheikhs with a strong local following, the most 
prominent of whom is Muhammad Abdel Maq-
soud  (known to his disciples as “faqih al-Qahira,” 
the jurist of Cairo). Unlike the Alexandria sheikhs, 
Abdel Maqsoud never hesitated to openly ques-
tion the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime.10 He 
was imprisoned for his views on several occasions 
and also spent time under house arrest. He gained 
further prestige by becoming the first Salafi sheikh 
to endorse the revolution on January 28, 2011.11 
Given the strong foothold al-Asala enjoys in Cairo, 
its candidates ran mainly on the Salafi coalition’s 
lists in the capital. 
The Construction and Development Party was 
created by al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic 
Group”), a formerly radical Islamist group founded 
in the late 1970s, which waged war on the Mubarak 
regime for more than 15 years before its leaders – 
most of whom were in jail – officially renounced 
violence in 1997. Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya’s ide-
ology combined Salafi and jihadist ideas. When 
the latter were abandoned, the group’s discourse 
became quite close to that of the Salafi Da‘wa.12 
At the same time, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya remains 
a tighly-knit group of several tens of thousands of 
activists, bound by common experiences of violent 
confrontation with the state. Unlike al-Jihad, the 
other main Egyptian radical Islamist group, which 
had pursued a strategy focused on decapitating the 
state (which it tried in 1981 by assassinating Pres-
ident Anwar al-Sadat), al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya 
had always been keen to develop a real social base 
through day-to-day social and religious activities. 
The group has historically enjoyed a strong foot-
hold in Middle Egypt, the area in which most Con-
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struction and Development Party candidates ran.  
What came as a surprise to many observers through-
out 2011 was how efficient the Nour Party was in 
getting organized, producing a political platform, 
campaigning, and dealing with the media. Emad 
Abdel Ghaffour is recognized as the first person in 
the Salafi Da‘wa to have suggested creating a polit-
ical party. Though he was one of the group’s orig-
inal founders in the late 1970s, Abdel Ghaffour’s 
profile differed from that of other Da‘wa figures be-
cause of the influences to which he had been ex-
posed. He had left Egypt around the turn of the mil-
lennium to settle in Turkey, and had only been back 
in the country for a few months when the revolu-
tion started. 
After lengthy discussions, Abdel Ghaffour eventu-
ally convinced the leadership of the Salafi Da‘wa 
to endorse his project.13 This did not, as some have 
argued, represent a complete ideological shift for 
the Da‘wa. After all, the movement’s leaders had 
never declared the practice of politics in itself as 
religiously forbidden;14 they had maintained a more 
ambiguous stance by simply avoiding any involve-
ment in domestic political matters under Mubarak. 
On June 15, 2011, when the Nour Party was offi-
cially established, Abdel Ghaffour became its first 
president.
For a group with no previous experience in formal 
politics, establishing a political program was the 
first real challenge. Abdel Ghaffour decided to 
form a group of academic experts, many of whom 
were not Salafis. Most of the Nour Party’s political 
platform was eventually written by these academ-
ics, with the Nour Party’s leadership only making 
sure that no religious red lines were crossed.15 The 
professional outlook of the platform helped rein-
force the Nour Party’s credibility, as did the par-
ty’s claims that it had established a partnership with 
“Japanese experts” to reform the Egyptian educa-
tion system (an argument that was often quoted by 
Nour Party voters interviewed by the author).16
Though most of the party’s founding members 
came from the Salafi Da‘wa, Emad Abdel Ghaffour 
was keen to use managerial methods to develop and 
expand the party’s structure. An interesting illustra-
tion of this was the selection of the party’s spokes-
men, which was conducted through an open com-
petition. Numerous candidates were interviewed, 
several of whom were finally chosen.17 While all 
of them are relatively young –  a significant differ-
ence from the Muslim Brotherhood – the young-
est of all is 27-year-old Nadir Bakkar.18 The choice 
of Bakkar, a bright and elegant young man with a 
degree in management and strong rhetorical skills, 
indicates the kind of image that the party seeks to 
project. In the Egyptian media scene, Bakkar soon 
became a sensation. 
The two other parties in the Salafi coalition have 
not been as successful in terms of organization. 
The Asala Party got into a violent conflict with an-
other Salafi group, the Hizb al-Fadila (“the party of 
virtue”), from which the Asala Party had original-
ly split. The Construction and Development Party, 
meanwhile, was handicapped by internal disputes 
among the leadership of its parent organization, al-
Gama‘a al-Islamiyya. These weaknesses did not, 
however, greatly affect the prospects of the Salafi 
coalition, as most of its campaigning was carried 
out by the Nour Party.
The coalition managed to present parliamentary 
candidates in all districts nationwide. In districts 
where the Da‘wa or one of the affiliated parties had 
a strong presence, the candidates came from those 
entities. Elsewhere, the coalition presented former-
ly independent personalities, who conformed with 
“Islamic moral standards.” This allowed the Salafi 
coalition to co-opt local figures of an Islamic bent 
who enjoyed a strong following but were unable to 
run on the Muslim Brotherhood’s lists because they 
were much less open to outsiders.
Those who followed the Nour Party’s campaign 
were surprised at the considerable resources the 
party seemed to have at its disposal. Its well de-
signed posters appeared everywhere (a worker at a 
printing press in Alexandria said that half a million 
copies of one such poster had been produced.)19 On 
the day of the vote, there were young members of 
the Nour Party in front of most polling stations, 
helping voters find their designated booth – some-
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thing which no other party, save the Brotherhood, 
had the capacity or the resources to do.20 Such ac-
tivities have fueled accusations of foreign – read 
Saudi (or Gulf) – funding for the Salafis, though 
verifying such claims has proved difficult. In re-
sponse, Nour Party leaders have constantly com-
plained about a lack of funds, arguing that the 
money for their campaign had come mostly from 
their candidates’ personal wealth and from the do-
nations of their members.21
The campaign rhetoric used by the Salafis pro-
vides another explanation for their success. Brand-
ing Muslim Brotherhood contenders as “candidates 
of the system,” Salafis often presented themselves 
as the only real “anti-system” candidates and genu-
inely “new” political actors.22 This was also a clever 
way of not only justifying, but also taking advan-
tage of their pre-revolution stance. As one Nour of-
ficial put it, “before the revolution, we, as opposed 
to the Brotherhood, refused to participate in an il-
legitimate system. We preferred to keep a distance. 
Now, some tell us: you were against politics – but 
this is not true. We had our own way of practicing 
politics; our stance was fundamentally a political 
stance!”23
In the Cairo suburb of Shubra al-Khayma, for in-
stance, Salafi supporters were keen to emphasize 
that the local popular Muslim Brotherhood candi-
date had been in politics for decades and had “done 
nothing for the people of the district when he was 
in the People’s Assembly.”24 Although the Brother-
hood rightly responded that, if their candidate had 
done little, it was only due to the obstruction of 
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, the Salafis’ 
argument seems to have had some effect on voters.25 
In lower-class neighborhoods, the Salafis were also 
quick to denounce the Brotherhood as composed 
of bourgeois elites disconnected from the street. As 
a local Nour party leader in a poor Tanta suburb 
argued, “we are from the people, we were on their 
side constantly during the Mubarak days, we have 
developed intimate knowledge of their problems… 
while the Brotherhood were wasting their time 
[with] useless institutional politics.”26
SALAFI POLITICS
As reflected in the quotations above, the electoral 
campaign created a genuine rift between the Salaf-
is and the Brotherhood. It was as if each group 
took the election to be a zero-sum game. Every 
vote gained by the Salafis would have to be taken 
from the Brothers, and vice versa. This sometimes 
led to the use of controversial tactics. Various ac-
counts report that Brotherhood sympathizers went 
to Salafi neighborhoods explaining that the election 
symbol of the Salafi coalition was the scale (in fact 
the Brotherhood’s), while Salafi supporters went 
to neighborhoods known as Brotherhood strong-
holds telling locals that the Brotherhood’s symbol 
was the lantern (in fact that of the Salafis).27 During 
the campaign period, these tensions were patently 
clear; in most of the interviews conducted by the 
author in December 2011, Brothers were very criti-
cal of Salafis, and vice versa.
In some ways, this intra-Islamist clash came as a 
surprise. Although the relationship between the 
Brotherhood and the Salafis had generally been 
tense before the revolution, the few months that 
followed Mubarak’s fall witnessed a genuine rap-
prochement between the two groups. Salafi lead-
ers made positive statements about the Brother-
hood, calling them – in the words of Muhammad 
Hassan – “those who most deserve and are the most 
competent to enter parliament,”28 while the Broth-
erhood made a serious attempt to turn the Salafis 
into a reservoir of support for the movement.29 In 
March 2011, the two groups co-led the campaign 
for the “yes” vote to approve proposed constitu-
tional amendments. The fact that their camp re-
ceived 77 percent of the vote was interpreted as a 
victory for both. 
A turning point in the relationship, however, seems 
to have been the demonstration of July 29, 2011. 
This was the first time after the revolution that Is-
lamists decided to protest en masse in Tahrir Square. 
A deal had been struck with non-Islamist forces, 
with the latter agreeing to participate on the condi-
tion that slogans be limited to calls for a quick tran-
sition to civilian rule and the trial of former regime 
officials. While Brotherhood members stuck to the 
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agreement, many Salafis came with posters de-
manding the implementation of sharia and chant-
ed “Islamiyya, Islamiyya” (“Islamic, Islamic”). 
The demonstration, dubbed by liberals as “Kanda-
har Friday,” was a public relations disaster for the 
Islamists. The Brothers, intent as always on pre-
serving their image of respectability, had no choice 
but to firmly criticize the events.30 From then on, 
the rift between the Brothers and the Salafis would 
only grow.
While competition with the Brotherhood may have 
pushed the Salafis in a more populist direction, the 
requirements of an electoral campaign forced Salafi 
parties – especially the Nour Party – to put forward 
a genuine political program, laying out a political, 
economic, and social vision for the country. Al-
though the formal content of the program released 
by the party remained vague on a number of key 
issues, Salafis have – in their daily dealings with 
the media – been forced to clarify their positions 
and take stances on all kinds of questions. This is a 
novelty for a group whose pre-revolution discourse 
was focused primarily on questions of creed and on 
a limited number of social issues. On the rare oc-
casions that political issues were addressed, they 
were discussed only in the most abstract terms.
One key debate that has divided the Egyptian politi-
cal scene since the revolution is that of the nature of 
the coming state. Salafis have, in their statements, 
staunchly opposed the concept of a “civil state” 
(dawla madaniyya), a term which they consider to 
be a rhetorical trick invented by their liberal foes to 
make the idea of a “secular state” (dawla ‘ilmani-
yya) more acceptable.31 Despite sometimes paying 
lip service to the formula, Salafis are also critical 
of the now widely accepted notion of a “civil state 
with an Islamic reference” (dawla madaniyya bi 
marja‘iyya islamiyya), advocated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, among others. For them, there exists 
a distinctive Islamic model of statehood which, 
they insist, is perfectly compatible with the modern 
state (al-dawla al-‘asriyya).32 
This indicates a significant shift in rhetoric. While 
the Muslim Brotherhood no longer officially de-
mands an “Islamic state,” some among the Salaf-
is seem to be making this demand all their own.33 
Though this may illustrate a divergence in the po-
litical strategies of the two groups, it should not 
be seen as very significant in ideological terms. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the “Islamic 
state” has remained a relatively general concept 
used by most Islamist movements with sometimes 
radically different agendas. It is more useful to an-
alyze the concrete policies advocated by the Nour 
Party.
Regarding the political system, the Nour Party now 
explicitly defends democratic34 mechanisms (i.e. 
elections at all levels, separation of powers, free-
dom of speech, etc.). They are keen, however, to 
stress that they distinguish between the “procedures 
of democracy,” which they accept, and the “philos-
ophy of democracy,” which they reject.35 For them, 
ultimate sovereignty cannot be held by the people, 
but only by God, meaning that there can be no dis-
cussion as to whether sharia, understood as an all-
encompassing corpus of law, should be enforced. 
This explains why Nour Party figures have advo-
cated changing Article 2 of the constitution from 
“the principles (mabadi‘) of the sharia are the main 
source to law” to “the rulings (ahkam) of the sharia 
are the main source of law.” This means for in-
stance that they still advocate the implementation 
of Islamic punishments (hudud).
When it comes to the status of religious minorities, 
the Nour Party’s platform is not explicit, simply 
stating that the “sharia guarantees religious free-
dom for Copts” and that “they have the same rights 
and duties as Muslims.”36 In interviews, Salafi fig-
ures have advocated a much stricter framework 
than that put forward by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
While the latter recognizes the concept of citizen-
ship and is ready to proclaim the political and legal 
equality of all citizens,37 Salafis tend to favor the 
traditional Islamic system of dhimma (protection), 
which existed during the period of the Caliph-
ate. According to this system, Christians and Jews 
living under an Islamic state are not asked to serve 
in the military and receive protection from the au-
thorities, but are required to pay a special tax, the 
jizya. 
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Another illustration of differing stances on the 
Coptic issue came with the celebration of Christ-
mas in January 2012. While the Brothers hung post-
ers greeting their “Christian brothers” in different 
Cairo neighborhoods and sent a high-ranking del-
egation to the Coptic cathedral to congratulate Pope 
Shenouda before the Christmas mass, the Salafis re-
fused to do any of the above, arguing that it is reli-
giously forbidden for Muslims to congratulate non-
Muslims on their religious holidays. Most Salafis 
were, however, keen to stress that this restriction 
applies only to religious occasions; congratulating 
Christians on personal occasions, such as weddings, 
is perfectly acceptable. 
On other social questions, the Nour Party’s platform 
again sticks to relatively general statements. On the 
status of women, for instance, the platform pro-
claims “the equality in human dignity between men 
and women.” In interviews and statements, Salafis 
have made it clear that they hold more conserva-
tive views than the Brotherhood. They are general-
ly not favorable to women’s participation in politi-
cal life, and argue for a strict segregation of sexes. 
They have also advocated banning alcohol, and 
some have expressed their willingness to impose 
a stricter dress code for women. At the same time, 
Salafis have been keen to stress that this is just one 
small part of their program. To liberal attacks claim-
ing that “all that matters for Salafis is banning beers 
and bikinis,” Construction and Development Party 
leader Tariq al-Zumur responded that the liberals, 
not the Salafis, are the ones obsessed with such su-
perficial issues. “We are going to run a country, not 
a cabaret,” he said.38
At the economic level, the Nour Party advocates 
more “left-leaning” policies than the Muslim Broth-
erhood. In particular, they seem more prone to 
stressing the redistributive role of the state, in con-
trast with the more pro-market Brothers. This po-
sition is consistent with the rhetoric used on the 
ground to attract the support of the lower classes. 
On international politics, finally, the Nour Party has 
adopted the same nationalist rhetoric common to 
most Egyptian parties, Islamist and non-Islamist, 
in the wake of the Arab Spring. In a context where 
almost all political actors have been very critical of 
the United States and Israel, the Nour Party’s posi-
tions generally fall within the mainstream. 
RELIGIOUS VS. POLITICAL SALAFISM
Despite its relative vagueness on certain issues, the 
Nour Party’s platform represents in many ways a 
departure from the traditional positions of the Salafi 
Da‘wa. To begin with, many of the organization’s 
leading sheikhs, including Said Abdel Azim, have 
written entire volumes denouncing the impiety of 
the democratic system39 to which the Nour Party 
now explicitly adheres. 
To enter the realm of institutional politics, members 
of the party have had to make important conces-
sions. For instance, despite their stance on women’s 
political participation, electoral laws forced them to 
present one female candidate on each of their lists. 
To avoid publishing their pictures, they were rep-
resented in campaign materials by a flower or the 
party logo, and in some cases, their names were 
replaced with those of their husbands. To be sure, 
those women always ran at the bottom of the lists, 
with no chance of being elected. It may not seem 
like much, but this still represented a breakthrough 
for the Salafi movement. The Nour Party also had 
to include Christians as founding members of the 
party, a move that the sheikhs of Alexandria had 
originally considered reprehensible.
In spite of this, it seems most of the sheikhs were 
convinced that, as long as the concessions remained 
limited, the benefits of political participation out-
weighed the evils. However, tensions have start-
ed to arise between the Nour Party and the Salafi 
sheikhs, with public spats becoming increasingly 
common since autumn 2011.40 In December, for in-
stance, Emad Abdel Ghaffour was asked on a talk 
show why the Nour Party had fielded no Christian 
candidates. He responded that he regretted this fact, 
and hoped Christians would run on the party’s lists 
in the future. This earned him explicit criticism on 
Sheikh Yasir Burhami’s website, which reaffirmed 
that only Muslims should occupy “positions linked 
to the objectives (maqasid) of the Muslim state.”41 
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Not long after, the Nour Party declared that it 
was considering a parliamentary alliance with 
non-Islamist parties, including Coptic business-
man Naguib Sawiris’s Free Egyptians. This again 
prompted severe reactions from Burhami, who in-
sisted that “any alliance with groups that oppose 
God’s Law is absolutely forbidden.”42 In late Feb-
ruary 2012, another dispute occurred when one of 
the party’s spokesmen, Muhammad Nour, accepted 
an invitation to attend celebrations for the anniver-
sary of the Iranian revolution at the Iranian embas-
sy in Cairo.  Sheikhs saw this as controversial be-
cause of the strong religious hostility Salafis harbor 
toward Shiites.  
What this reflects is the increasing autonomization 
of the Nour Party, which is developing its own po-
litical logic, distinct from the religious logic of the 
sheikhs. In this way, political Salafism may be qui-
etly separating from religious Salafism. This trans-
formation is met with resentment by the move-
ment’s traditional leaders, with some even describ-
ing an outright struggle for power and influence 
between two factions within the Nour Party: one 
pro-sheikhs and the other pro-political autonomy.43 
Internal observers argue that the struggle is getting 
particularly heated, as the first general congress of 
the party should be held soon (although no date has 
yet been announced). This congress is seen as espe-
cially important, because a new party president will 
be elected, and Emad Abdel Ghaffour has already 
announced that he will not run.44 The personality 
and background of the new president will have a 
decisive impact on the party’s future. 
THE RISE OF REVOLUTIONARY SALAFISM
In the wake of the revolution, the dominant Salafi 
groups, as in the case of the Brotherhood, have 
demonstrated their willingness to play the game of 
institutional politics. They have taken a relative-
ly non-confrontational stance with respect to the 
ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). 
This has led some of their liberal foes to denounce 
an alleged “deal” between the Islamists and the 
army.45 Avoiding confrontation with SCAF allowed 
those parties to focus their efforts on parliament, 
turning it into a stronghold of Islamist influence. 
But the parliament is not the only center of power 
or legitimacy in the country. Tahrir Square contin-
ues to represent an alternative source of political le-
gitimacy, with an agenda that is increasingly hostile 
to military rule. In the months following the revolu-
tion, Tahrir mostly featured demonstrations of left-
ists and liberals. Since the summer of 2011, Salafis 
have been present in those demonstrations in grow-
ing numbers. These Salafis are generally not Nour 
Party supporters; the party, and the Salafi Da‘wa, 
have in many cases forbidden their members from 
participating. These “revolutionary” Salafis belong 
to smaller, more loosely organized movements. 
Others are proponents of Sheikh Hazim Salah Abu 
Ismail, an early supporter of the January 25 revolu-
tion, and a leading Tahrir figure, known for his un-
compromising stance against the military council.
The son of a prominent 1970s Muslim Brotherhood 
figure and a former Brother who embraced Salafi 
ideas, the charismatic Abu Ismail rose to political 
stardom in the wake of the revolution. An indepen-
dent who declared his candidacy for president as 
early as mid-2011, he managed to rally an impres-
sively large crowd of young Salafis. At the same 
time, his revolutionary rhetoric earned him some re-
spect within the broader movement of Tahrir youth. 
For instance, during the events of late November 
2011, when Muhammad Mahmud Street turned 
into a battlefield and Tahrir Square remained occu-
pied for a number of weeks, some protesters sug-
gested that power be handed over to a civil council 
made up of Muhammad al-Baradei, Abdel Moneim 
Abul Futuh, and Hazim Salah Abu Ismail.46
Through the figure of Abu Ismail, Salafism has 
thus managed to impose itself as a legitimate revo-
lutionary actor. However, the relationship between 
the more established Salafism of the Nour Party 
and its allies, and the revolutionary Salafism of Abu 
Ismail and the other independent Salafi groups, re-
mains ambiguous. While their political strategies 
differ radically, strong personal links exist between 
Abu Ismail and most Salafi leaders. These relation-
ships were particularly important in the run-up to 
the presidential elections, when many among the 
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grassroots of the Salafi Da‘wa and Nour Party 
called for an open endorsement of Abu Ismail’s bid. 
However, there was much resistance from above. 
The leaders worried that they would have no con-
trol over Abu Ismail and that his election could 
bring them into an open confrontation with the mil-
itary council – something they had been trying to 
avoid.
In early April 2012, Abu Ismail, who was seen as a 
serious presidential contender with over 20 percent 
support in some polls, was disqualified by the elec-
toral commission. Officials argued that his mother 
was granted American citizenship when she was 
living in the United States, constituting a breach 
of Egyptian electoral law. This was a major shock 
for his supporters, some of whom organized sit-ins 
and demonstrations to protest the decision. Unsur-
prisingly, however, the Nour Party and the Salafi 
Da‘wa seemed quite relieved not to have to take a 
stance on Abu Ismail’s candidacy. 
On April 28, after meeting with the three remaining 
Islamist candidates – the independent Muhammad 
Salim al-Awwa, the Muslim Brotherhood’s official 
candidate Muhammad Mursi, and the ex-Brother-
hood figure Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh – the Nour 
Party and the Salafi Da‘wa decided to endorse the 
bid of Abul Futuh.47 Notably, this decision was taken 
through a vote, something the two groups’ spokes-
men were keen to emphasize as proof of their com-
mitment to internal democracy. This result seemed 
surprising to many, as Abul Futuh is known as a 
liberal Islamist who enjoys the backing of many in 
the non-Islamist camp. 
This created a stir in the Salafi sphere, with the 
smaller Asala Party and the Religious Council 
for Rights and Reform (al-hay’a al-shar’iyya li-l-
huquq wa-l-islah), an association of Salafi-leaning 
ulama, announced their support for Morsi. Despite 
this, the Nour Party and the Salafi Da’wa chose 
to maintain their position. They were soon joined 
by al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and its party, the Con-
struction and Development Party. Despite dissent-
ing voices, the biggest and more established Salafi 
groups were thus siding with Abul Futuh.
There was, however, an obvious reason for this 
choice. Salafis do not want all the powers to be con-
centrated in the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which already holds the biggest share of seats in 
parliament. Backing Brotherhood candidate Mu-
hammad Mursi was therefore not an option. Be-
tween the two remaining candidates, Abul Futuh 
was seen as being more likely to win. However, the 
decision to support Abul Futuh must also be seen 
as an outcome of the evolution of the Nour Party 
toward a more pragmatic and accommodationist 
stance. Commenting on the party’s decision, Nour 
Party spokesman Yusri Hammad said: “the party 
didn’t request from Abul Futuh that he commit 
to implementing the rulings of the sharia, and he 
didn’t even offer that. We decided to support him 
because of his national project which permits the 
consensus of all national forces to rebuild Egypt 
and get it out of the dark tunnel.”48 What is interest-
ing is that this stance was also adopted by the Salafi 
Da‘wa – an indication that, in the conflict between 
religious and political Salafism, the balance may be 
leaning toward the latter. 
In spite of this, Abu Ismail’s disqualification from 
the presidential race did not put an end to the phe-
nomenon he has come to represent. His most active 
supporters are now gathered in a movement called 
“Hazimun”49 (proponents of Hazim, but also “the 
determined,” a pun on the meaning of “hazim” 
in Arabic) and have already pledged to continue 
their struggle. Some are even working toward the 
establishment of a political party, Hizb al-Umma 
al-Masriyya (“The party of the Egyptian nation”), 
which pledges to follow in Abu Ismail’s footsteps.50 
Revolutionary Salafism will live on.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF POLITICAL 
SALAFISM IN EGYPT
The rise of political Salafism has reshaped the 
Egyptian political scene. Though the Muslim 
Brotherhood still occupies the dominant position, 
it has lost its hegemony over Islamist politics. The 
relationship between Salafis and the Brotherhood 
has evolved since the revolution, from discrete co-
operation to fierce competition. The final outcome 
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of this competition remains uncertain. It could end 
up pushing the Salafis to a more intransigent stance 
intended to distinguish them from the “responsi-
ble” and “pragmatic” Brotherhood. Alternatively, it 
could convince the Salafis to fully embrace a more 
pragmatic politics themselves. This question is also 
closely related to that of the relationship between 
the Nour Party and the Salafi Da’wa, and the re-
sponse will depend on the extent to which the party 
manages to assert its political independence. The 
rise of revolutionary Salafism represents an addi-
tional challenge, as the Nour Party now faces the 
pressure of the “Salafi street,” which Abu Ismail 
has helped bring to life. For the moment, howev-
er, it is significant that the Nour Party and the other 
more established Salafi groups have seemed more 
inclined to follow a gradual and pragmatic path 
rather than to bend to the pressure of their own ide-
alists, as the backing of Abul Futuh indicates. What 
remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which 
the Salafi leadership will be able to impose this 
shift on the movement’s constituency. The defeat 
of Abul Futuh in the first round of presidential elec-
tions, arguably because a significant proportion of 
Salafis’ were reluctant to back a “liberal” candi-
date, illustrates the difficulties ahead for the lead-
ership, should the latter decide to continue on the 
same path.
About a year after their emergence, Salafi parties 
– especially the Nour Party – have become lead-
ing actors in Egypt’s political arena. Through this 
process, they have proven a certain ability to adapt 
to the rules of the political game. They have begun 
developing a political discourse and strategy that 
is to some extent distinct from the initial religious 
or theological considerations of the sheikhs. More 
importantly, this political discourse and strategy re-
mains largely in the making. These shifts are not 
taking shape in a vacuum, or merely as a response 
to local Egyptian politics; political Salafis are also 
wary of the regional and global environment. West-
ern and regional policymakers must therefore be 
aware that their statements and actions may influ-
ence the discourse and strategy of political Salaf-
is and may eventually affect internal decisions on 
which direction they will take. To maximize their 
influence, the United States and European coun-
tries should consider establishing a regular, sub-
stantive dialogue with the Nour Party. What is cer-
tain is that reproducing the pre-Arab Spring policy 
of ignoring Islamists – including Egypt’s Salafis – 
can only be counter-productive.
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